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COMMENT
The Duty Dilemma: When the Duty to Mitigate Damages
and the Duty to Preserve Evidence Collide
I. Introduction
Much has been made about the importance of moral duty in contract
law. For philosophical titans like David Hume1 and Emmanuel Kant,2 a
contract is a device that binds men to the obligatory affects of their Word.3
The ill-advised contractual renege evinces the moral turpitude of a society
fallen asunder. For those who subscribe to Kant’s view, the law of contracts
is permeated by the transcendent concept of duty.4 Because a contract
creates duties where none previously existed, it is therefore the underlying
promise to take some action that is the essence of a contract.5
Contemporary American contract law borrows much from the moralistic
lineage of Kantian ethics and Hume’s social contract.6 Accordingly, the
breach of the modern contract invites an application of these ancient duty
constructs, especially where two competing duties arise simultaneously.
Twenty-first century American contract law is a fertile ground for the
application of Kant and Hume’s approaches to duty. Nearly 270,000 civil
1. Regarded as the greatest English philosopher, Hume made salient contributions to
the philosophy of human nature. TERENCE PENELHUM, DAVID HUME: AN INTRODUCTION TO
HIS PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM ix, 11 (1992). Although he spoke to “contracts” in the social
sense, Hume posited that the obligations of contract are necessary to support a civilized
society. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
1-2 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
2. A highly revered moral philosopher, Kant developed the categorical imperative, a
“formula of universal law” which states that individuals ought to “[a]ct as if the maxim of
[one’s] action were to become by [one’s] will a universal law of nature.” Mark
Timmons, The Philosophical and Practical Significance of Kant's Universality Formulations
of the Categorical Imperative, 13 JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHT UND ETHIK 313, 313 (2005). The
imperative governs duties created via contract by appealing to the universal strictures of
moral duty. See id. at 319.
3. FRIED, supra note 1, at 1.
4. See IMMANUEL KANT & H.J. PATON, THE MORAL LAW OR KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13-14 (H.J. Paton ed., 3d ed. reprt. 1958) (stating Kant’s view
that “[d]uty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law”).
5. FRIED, supra note 1, at 1.
6. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 128-29 (1989) (ebook) (explaining how the legal thought
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was influenced by the musings of Kant and thus shaped
Lochner-era jurisprudence).
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actions were filed in the United States District Courts in 2017, of which
23,523 sounded in contract.7 In the Oklahoma District Courts,
approximately 2,700 civil suits were filed in 2017—410 were breach of
contract actions.8 Breach of contract is a cause of action that covers a wide
variety of matters, ranging from the Hannah Montana creator’s suit against
Disney9 to a buyer’s complaint against Kold-Serve alleging receipt of a
defective ice cream machine.10 Because the most complex breaches of
contract are spawned in the backwater of undeveloped law, it is paramount
that all parties understand the full extent of the duties they owe in order to
mitigate legal risk. Unfortunately for the unfettered flow of business, this is
easier said than done. It is not uncommon, due to the nature of contractual
relationships and the unpredictable nature of business, for common law
duties to arise simultaneously and appear to be mutually exclusive. It is in
these situations that the legal risk to the contracting parties is at its highest.
A hypothetical illustrates the conundrum. Suppose Buyer B purchases a
double-offset disc plow11 from seller S to pull behind his tractor. The
contract contains provisions expressly warranting its fitness as a farm
implement in Midwestern wheat country. After several weeks, B discovers
that the disc does not work properly and barely penetrates the soil. He
originally purchased the disc because his old disc was saddled with
ineffective hydraulic connections that made using it for more than a few
hours impossible. Now, B has two useless discs. Pursuant to the sale
contract, S makes several efforts to fix the implement but never gets it to
function as promised. Eventually, B loses the luxury of time and begins to
remove hydraulic pumps and hoses from the new disc and transplant them
onto the old disc. Before long, B’s farm operation is up and running and he
is back to work. But as the legal system is all too aware, this is not the end
of the story. When poor weather conditions catch up with B and render him
unable to finish his fields, he is furious—if S had not sold him a defective
7. Federal Court Management Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS (Sept. 30, 2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0930.2017.pdf.
Additionally, in 2005, United States state courts disposed of nearly 30,000 civil trials. LYNN
LANGTON, M.A. & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY
TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 1 (2009). Of those, nearly one-third were breach of
contract actions. Id. at 2.
8. Federal Court Management Statistics, supra note 7.
9. Applebarry, Inc. v. Bigwood Films, Inc., No. B281327, 2018 WL 1149541, at *1-2
(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2018).
10. Kold-Serve Corp. v. Ward, 736 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App. 1987).
11. Offset/Tandom Disc-Type Tillage Implement, U.S. Patent No. 5,881,820 (filed Feb.
21, 1997).
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product back when the weather was fair, his work would be complete.
Subsequently, B files a complaint in the local county court alleging breach
of contract. S, preparing to defend the claim, seeks to establish the character
of the disc as it was when he sold it. He finds, however, that this is nearly
impossible—the disc has been stripped of all its hydraulic equipment and
barely resembles what he originally sold to B.
Enter: the Duty Dilemma. While S has a viable defense to the breach of
contract claim—B’s failure to preserve evidence—B has a compelling
rebuttal. In anticipation of economic damages, he altered the equipment to
salvage his business operations and continue production. He was merely
performing his duty to mitigate damages. This forces upon the court the
unenviable task of determining which duty is superior—the duty to mitigate
or the duty to preserve evidence. When a plaintiff-buyer materially alters
equipment it purchased from the defendant-seller in order to mitigate its
damages, and the seller asserts that the buyer breached its duty to preserve
evidence, how should the law resolve these competing duties?
The duty to preserve evidence and the duty to mitigate damages are not
mutually exclusive. When a buyer anticipates bringing a breach of contract
claim, it must give the seller an adequate opportunity to inspect the
defective product. However, the opportunity to inspect is finite. The
plaintiff-buyer has the last clear chance to avoid the collision of duties by
granting the defendant-buyer a legally sufficient inspection prior to a
foreseeable breach of contract claim. Failure by the defendant-seller to
make such an inspection produces an inference in favor of the plaintiffbuyer, rebuttable by negating the contract via traditional principles of
contract law or a showing that the opportunity to inspect was inadequate.
This Comment explores the history of the duty to mitigate and the duty
to preserve evidence in the United States—specifically Oklahoma—and
explains how parties that are susceptible to this clash of common law
canons can minimize their legal risk. Part II illustrates the development and
legal significance of evidence spoliation, exposing the issues that arise
when the duty to preserve evidence is actionable in tort as the breach of a
substantive duty, rather than just the violation of a court order. It then takes
a similar look at the legal framework of the duty to mitigate and explains
how the primordial “last clear chance rule” can help frame the issue. Part III
addresses the conflict of law problem that has infiltrated the duty to
preserve evidence and explains why the analysis confronts a crossroads; is
the duty procedural, springing from the inherent authority of the courts to
police themselves, or substantive, grounded in a fundamental duty to
anticipate litigation and preserve material evidence? Part IV resurrects the
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incomplete dicta in Mariposa Farms, LLC v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., and
articulates a standard for measuring the sufficiency of a defendant-seller’s
inspection opportunity, the significance of when alterations were made, and
how the duties can be reconciled and performed simultaneously. Part IV
then posits a solution to the Duty Dilemma and explains what to do when a
plaintiff-buyer has been sold a defective product but is uncertain how to
traverse the Duty Dilemma tightrope.
II. Spoliation and the Duty to Mitigate
A. The Duty to Preserve Evidence
The breach of the duty to preserve evidence has gone by many names,
but the most common is “spoliation,”12 a term that drips with negativity and
legal fortunes gone awry. The underlying doctrine dates back nearly three
hundred years ago to the case of Armory v. Delamirie.13 Considered by
many as the mother of the spoliation doctrine, Armory encapsulated the
affectionate melodrama of a chimney sweep who discovered a valuable
jewel in the course of his work.14 When he took it to the goldsmith, a
deceitful apprentice traded out the jewel and misled the chimney sweep to
believe that his treasure was worth merely three halfpence.15 Unsatisfied
with the amount, the chimney sweep demanded his jewel be returned.16
When the apprentice fetched nothing but an empty socket, the sweep
brought an action in trover to recover the missing jewel. At trial, “the Chief
Justice directed the jury, that unless the [goldsmith] did produce the jewel,
and shew it not to be of the finest water, they should presume the strongest
against him, and make the value of the best jewels the measure of their
damages: which they accordingly did.”17 The court then coined the now
familiar axiom Contra spoliatorem omnia praesumuntur, meaning, “all
things are presumed against a spoliator.”18
Spoliation is the “destruction or material alteration of evidence or the
failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or
12. See Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., 1999 OK 33, ¶ 46, 987 P.2d 1185, 1202.
13. (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 1 Strange 505 (K.B.).
14. Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 517-18 n.12 (D. Md. 2009).
15. Id. at 517 n.12.
16. Id. at 517-18 n.12.
17. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. 664).
18. MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE xv
(Daniel F. Gourash ed., Am. Bar Ass’n 3d ed. 2013); Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. 664; see also
Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988) (articulating the modern
application of Armory), overruled by Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2009).
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reasonably foreseeable litigation.”19 A great bane to the scholars of the
field, the term is commonly mispronounced as “spoilation” as a result of its
uncertain etymology.20 What is certain, however, is that spoliation is a
pervasive issue that continues to undermine the judicial system. 21
According to early surveys of litigators, half surveyed “believe that ‘unfair
and inadequate disclosure of material information prior to trial [is] a
“regular or frequent” problem . . . [and] 69% of surveyed antitrust attorneys
[have] encountered unethical practices,’ including, most commonly,
destruction of evidence.”22 The temptation to spoliate evidence is great—
the civil discovery regime “make[s] spoliation the bad man’s choice.”23
At bottom, the duty to preserve evidence compels the maintenance and
protection of admissible evidence when litigation is on the horizon.24 This
duty does not manifest itself solely at the twilight of litigation, but
frequently extends “to that period before the litigation when a party
reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated
litigation.”25 Thus, constructive notice is often the crux of the spoliation
contention in civil litigation, requiring sensitive, case-by-case analysis of
the facts to determine whether such a duty existed.26
The duty to preserve evidence is a two-man game. A party with reason to
believe that certain documents or tangible items might have evidentiary
value in impending litigation must give the other party an adequate
opportunity to inspect them.27 It must provide this opportunity even if it is
not in control or possession of such evidence when litigation becomes
foreseeable or when an alteration is about to be made.28 Because evidence is
19. Barnett v. Simmons, 2008 OK 100, ¶ 21, 197 P.3d 12, 20 (citing West v. Goodyear
Tire, 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)).
20. KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 18, at xv n.1.
21. Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1991).
22. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 598-99 (1985)).
23. Id. at 795.
24. Barnett, ¶ 20, 197 P.3d at 20.
25. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591
(4th Cir. 1991)).
26. See, e.g., Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008)
(noting that the determination whether a dispatcher’s tapes are relevant and thus subject to
the duty to preserve is a fact-specific inquiry); Jamie Weissglass & Rossana Parrotta, The
Duty to Preserve and the Risks of Spoliation, N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept. 2014, at 27, 28
(“Unfortunately, there is no bright-line test to determine when the duty is triggered.”).
27. Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 591.
28. Id. (citing Andersen v. Schwartz, 687 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234-35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)).
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often discarded innocently in the course of business, the term “spoliation”
encompasses the entire spectrum of intent, ranging from “intentional [to]
negligent destruction or loss of tangible and relevant evidence which
impairs a party’s ability to prove or defend a claim.”29 The level of intent
determines the extent to which the court will employ its sanctioning
power.30 Intentional spoliation of evidence is treated most harshly.31 While
severe sanctions are generally reserved for willful, bad faith conduct,
Oklahoma also permits sanctions for negligent alterations that precede
foreseeable litigation.32 This assessment often comes down to the
procedural posture of the litigation and whether a motion to compel has
been filed.33 A motion to compel eliminates the need to find intent—the
language of title 12, section 3237(B)(2) of the Oklahoma Statutes does not
require it.34
Although the period immediately prior to the commencement of
litigation is the most heavily scrutinized for spoliation,35 it is not the only
time that the duty presents itself. The alteration of evidence after a motion
to compel has been filed is most conspicuous.36 In the spirit of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 37, Oklahoma law explicitly provides for its courts’
sanctioning authority when a motion to compel has been violated:
If a party or an officer, director or managing agent of a party or a
person designated under . . . this title to testify on behalf of a
party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order made under subsection A of this section or
Section 3235 of this title, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under subsection F of Section 3226 of this title, the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to
the failure as are just.37
Subsection (A), in relevant part, describes the options for moving parties
with regards to enforcing discovery:

29. Barnett, ¶ 21, 197 P.3d at 20 (citing United States ex rel. Koch v. Koch Indus., 197
F.R.D. 488, 490 (N.D. Okla. 1999)).
30. See Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997).
31. Barnett, ¶ 18, 197 P.3d at 19.
32. Id. ¶ 19, 197 P.3d at 19.
33. See id.
34. Id. ¶ 17, 197 P.3d at 19.
35. See id. ¶ 17-18, 197 P.3d at 19.
36. See id.
37. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3237(B)(2) (2011).
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[I]f a party, in response to a request for inspection and copying
submitted under Section 3234 of this title, fails to produce
documents or respond that the inspection or copying will be
permitted as requested or fails to permit the inspection or
copying as requested . . . , the discovering party may move for an
order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order
compelling inspection and copying in accordance with the
request or subpoena. The motion must include a statement that
the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
either in person or by telephone with the person or party failing
to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or
material without court action.38
Oklahoma has interpreted section 3237 to require a motion to compel
before invoking sanctions.39 Moreover, sanctions arising under the general
grant of section 3237 must spring from a party’s failure to obey an order of
the court.40 It is important to note that a violation of a court order is not the
only basis on which the court can sanction spoliation.41 Because courts have
“inherent authority to impose sanctions for abuse of the discovery process,”
they have “the power to sanction for abusive litigation practices or for
abuse of judicial process, even if an order compelling discovery has not

38. Id. § 3237(A)(2).
39. See, e.g., Barnett v. Simmons, 2008 OK 100, ¶¶ 14, 17, 197 P.3d 12, 18, 19 (citing
Helton v. Coleman, 1991 OK 43, ¶¶ 10-11, 811 P.2d 100, 101 (indicting the trial court’s
decision to sanction the defendant’s conduct when there had been no violation of an order
under the discovery regime)) (holding that “[a] motion to compel is a prerequisite to
sanctions being imposed under § 3237” and that intent speaks merely to the severity of the
sanction, not whether one should be imposed).
40. Id. In Barnett, the court ordered the spoliator to produce his hard drive for
examination. Id. ¶ 22, 197 P.3d at 20. Wasting no time, he hired a computer expert to “work
on the computer” and perform other maintenance activities, all without informing the
moving party’s counsel. Id. He insisted that the computer was simply undergoing a routine
“check-up” and that he was a novice computer user with no intent to alter evidence. Id. ¶ 9,
197 P.3d at 16. At no point was the expert notified that the computer and its hard drive were
the subject of a court order. Id. ¶ 22, 197 P.3d at 20. The court ultimately found this conduct
to be a textbook violation of section 3237(B)(2), explaining that intent is irrelevant and that
failure to obey a court order is a strict liability offense. Id. ¶ 24, 197 P.3d at 21. Furthermore,
it noted that the act of turning the computer over to an expert was “reasonably foreseeably
destructive of evidence” and “d[id] in fact destroy evidence that [prejudiced] the opposing
party’s right to a fair trial.” Id. ¶ 25, 197 P.3d at 21 (quoting Holm-Waddle v. William D.
Hawley, M.D., Inc., 1998 OK 53, ¶ 10, 967 P.2d 1180, 1182).
41. See id. ¶ 14, 197 P.3d at 18.
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been made.”42 When a party engages in this abusive conduct, there are a
number of sanctions at the courts’ disposal.43 These include “refusing to
allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses, prohibiting the party from introducing designated matters in
evidence, treating the failure to obey as contempt of court, dismissing the
case or entering default judgment.”44
It is important to note that the duty to preserve evidence extends to the
parties’ agents as well.45 Because a corporation operates at the direction of
its many human agents, spoliation presents unique issues in complex
organizational structures.46 When spoliation occurs, and the defending party
attempts to shift the blame by arguing that a third party destroyed the
evidence, such a defense will not shield it from sanctions if that third party
is deemed the spoliator’s agent.47 In one such case, plaintiffs were held
responsible for the spoliation of an allegedly defective vehicle back seat
when a third party repair garage discarded it, due to the fact that “plaintiffs
retained counsel before repairs were begun and that they were fully aware
that any potential lawsuit against Nissan would revolve around alleged
defects in the driver's side seat.”48 Not surprisingly, the application of
agency principles to the duty to preserve evidence has a substantial impact
on parties with document retention policies.49 In circumstances where
documents have been lost as a result of haphazard, willfully negligent
retention policies, courts have invoked their inherent powers to sanction the
spoliating conduct.50
Agency law suggests that a litigant’s preservation obligations are shaped
by the size of the organization.51 When litigation becomes reasonably
42. Id. (citing Bentley v. Hickory Coal Corp., 1992 OK CIV APP 68, ¶ 15, 849 P.2d
417, 420 (holding that the court’s broad sanctioning power allowed it to hold the plaintiff’s
lawyer in contempt even after a voluntary dismissal)).
43. Id. ¶ 15, 197 P.3d at 18.
44. Id.
45. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Hearth & Home Techs., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-2234,
2008 WL 2571227, at *7 (M.D. Penn. June 25, 2008).
46. See id. at *6-9.
47. Id. at *7.
48. Id. (quoting Austin v. Nissan Motor Corp., U.S.A., Civ. A. No. 95-1464, 1996 WL
117472, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 1996)).
49. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 615
(D.N.J. 1997).
50. See id.
51. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(explaining how the size of the organization contributed to counsel’s difficulty gaining
compliance with a litigation hold by the organization’s many agents).
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foreseeable, counsel is responsible for imposing a “litigation hold” on its
corporate client to “ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”52 As a
general rule, this hold extends to accessible forms of evidence existing at
the cusp of litigation as well as evidence that surfaces during litigation.53
The institution of a litigation hold is only the beginning.54 Counsel has a
continuing duty to preserve access to relevant evidence, monitor
compliance with the hold, and maintain an appropriate level of
communication with the client.55 This ensures “(1) that all relevant
information (or at least all sources of relevant information) is discovered,
(2) that relevant information is retained on a continuing basis; and (3) that
relevant non-privileged material is produced to the opposing party.”56
The litigation hold is only the tip of the iceberg—counsel then has a
continuing duty to find and preserve relevant evidence.57 This requires
becoming intimately familiar with the client’s document retention
policies.58 Such knowledge is best taken from the source; key players in the
litigation as well as agents responsible for the relevant evidence must be
adequately informed of their continuing duty to preserve it.59 “Because
these ‘key players’ are the ‘employees likely to have relevant
information,’ it is particularly important that the preservation duty be
communicated clearly to them [and they] should be periodically reminded
that the preservation duty is still in place.”60
The court’s sanctions against the apprentice in Delamirie established the
adverse inference as a staple of spoliation claims.61 And it is no easy
sanction to elicit from the courts.62 Spoliation sanctions are appropriate
when “(1) a party has a duty to preserve evidence because it knew, or
should have known, that litigation was imminent, and (2) the adverse party
was prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence.”63 It is well settled that
52. Id. at 431.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 432.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 433-34 (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
61. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 1 Strange 505 (K.B.).
62. Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 2009).
63. Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1032 (10th
Cir. 2007)); see also Jordan F. Miller Corp. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Serv., No. 97-5089,
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an adverse inference is appropriate only if the moving party can show bad
faith.64 Mere negligence is not enough.65 Failure to prove bad faith
effectively takes dismissal off the table and compels the court to consider
softer sanctions.66 Courts narrowly tailor sanctions to match the conduct.67
On appeal, a district court’s findings of bad faith or negligence are
reviewed for clear error, and its decision regarding the extent of sanctions is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.68
The district courts have broad discretion to craft a spoliation sanction,69
and they have shown their creativity.70 The extent of sanctions, however,
depends on the severity of the conduct. Outside of involuntary dismissal, an
adverse inference is the most severe sanction at the court’s disposal.71 The
conduct receiving an adverse inference must be proportionate to the
severity of the sanction, and thus, courts generally save dismissal and
adverse inferences for intentional conduct.72 The “bad faith destruction of a
document [or tangible object] relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise
to an inference that production of the document would have been
unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction.”73 The conduct must
also give rise to an inference that the spoliating party likely destroyed

1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2739, at *13 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1998) (finding that two primary
factors control the determination of spoliation sanctions: “(1) the degree of culpability of the
party who lost or destroyed the evidence, and (2) the degree of actual prejudice to the other
party”).
64. See Turner, 563 F.3d at 1149-50.
65. Id. at 1150; see also Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a showing of bad faith is a prerequisite to awarding an adverse inference
because negligence “does not support an inference of consciousness of a weak case”).
66. Turner, 563 F.3d at 1149.
67. See Jordan F. Miller Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2739, at *20-21.
68. Turner, 563 F.3d at 1149-50.
69. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
70. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(ordering the defendant to bear the cost of re-depositions, restoration of documents from
backup tape, attorney’s fees, and instructing the jury to make an adverse inference on other
material documents).
71. See id. at 437-38.
72. Id. at 436-37. Although the district courts have the broad power to effect an outright
dismissal, they are frugal. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). A wise use of
the inherent power seeks to restrict its reach only to the extent of the harm, “vindicat[ing]
judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court
and mak[ing] the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy.”
Id. at 46.
73. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997).
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evidence in an effort to avoid the exposure of what would have inevitably
been unfavorable information.74
Courts have traditionally used a three-step analysis for determining the
appropriate sanction.75 First, the sanction must be designed
prophylactically, with the ultimate purpose to deter the conduct.76 Second,
because the spoliator increased the risk of an erroneous judgment, the
sanction should be formulated to require the spoliator to bear that risk. 77
Finally, the sanction should “restore ‘the prejudiced party to the same
position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence
by the opposing party.’”78 The United States Supreme Court has established
that the district courts have discretion to dismiss lawsuits, explaining that
the inherent powers of the court enable it to craft sanctions necessary to
effectuate its purposes.79 By way of these implied powers, the “Courts of
justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation,
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and
submission to their lawful mandates.”80 These powers are “governed not by
rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.”81
While intent drives a large part of the consideration for sanctions, courts
look to see whether the movant was provided a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the evidence before it was materially altered. Thus, a plaintiff that
asserts a breach of contract claim for damage to a machine must give the
defendants a reasonable opportunity to inspect the subject parts.82 In Jordan
F. Miller Corp., for example, the plaintiff brought a breach of contract
action when the aircraft it had purchased from the defendant malfunctioned
74. Vick v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975).
75. See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)).
79. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
80. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); see also Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874) (holding that “[t]he law happily prescribes the
punishment which the court can impose for contempts” and can exercise this authority “in
any cause or hearing before them”).
81. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962).
82. See Jordan F. Miller Corp. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Serv., No. 97-5089, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2739, at *6 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1998) (holding that, prior to making an
alteration to relevant evidence, the movant was entitled to a hands-on inspection and testing
of the landing gear).
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and caused $55,000 in damage.83 After the claim was submitted to
insurance, the aircraft was inspected and the defective parts were removed
and destroyed.84 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that while the plaintiff
had an opportunity to inspect the aircraft’s components and develop a
theory of liability ahead of litigation, the defendants had no such
opportunity.85 Finding the defendant’s argument persuasive that a visual,
hands-on inspection was essential to their defense, the court affirmed the
sanctions.86
But the duty to provide reasonable inspection is finite.87 While the duty
to preserve arises only when the party “knows or should know that the
evidence is relevant in imminent or [pending] litigation,”88 a party may
destroy
relevant
evidence
“after
[it]
discharges
[its]
duty to preserve evidence by ‘giving the other side notice of a potential
claim and a full and fair opportunity to inspect relevant evidence.’”89 For an
inspection to be sufficient, it must occur when the inspecting party
essentially has constructive notice of litigation.90 Otherwise, the inspection
will be for naught.91
Not all evidence lost prior to or during foreseeable litigation gives rise to
actionable spoliation—the movant must suffer some material detriment. If
the court does not find that the moving party was prejudiced as a result of
the spoliating conduct, then there is no basis for imposing sanctions.92 In
Turner, the plaintiff brought a gender discrimination suit against her
potential employer, Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo), after she
was denied an entry-level position in the company.93 During discovery,
PSCo produced thousands of documents but failed to include the interview
notes from several of the relevant hiring years.94 The plaintiff filed a motion
to compel in the district court, seeking an adverse inference as a result of
83. Id. at *4-7
84. Id. at *6.
85. Id. at *19.
86. Id. at *20.
87. Brassfield v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co, No. CIV-11-1316-F, 2012 WL 12864942,
at *11 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 13, 2012).
88. Id. at *8 (quoting Jordan F. Miller Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2739, at *5).
89. Miller v. Lankow, 801 N.W.2d 120, 129 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Golke, 768 N.W.2d 729, 737 (Wis. 2009)).
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1150 (10th Cir. 2009).
93. Id. at 1140-42.
94. Id. at 1148.
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the missing interview notes.95 Characterizing her argument as a “spoliation
of evidence” claim, the district court granted summary judgment for PSCo,
citing the plaintiff’s failure to prove bad faith.96 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit scolded the plaintiff for failing to assert Rule 37 sanctions and
returned a decision for PSCo, explaining that there was no evidence that the
plaintiff was “actually, rather than merely theoretically” prejudiced by its
loss.97 In addition, the court pointed to the myriad other interview-related
documents, as well as the deposition of her interviewer, as evidence tending
show a lack of bad faith.98 As a result, summary judgment was affirmed.99
In order to effectuate the power of the federal courts, parties with viable
spoliation claims are advised to seek sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37.100 A party who is not “diligent in the defense of [its] own
interests” and fails to invoke Rule 37 to remedy the alleged prejudice
“forecloses access to the substantial weaponry in the district court’s
arsenal” and leaves sanctions under a “spoliation of evidence” theory as the
only remaining option.101 Rule 37(a), in relevant part, allows a party to
“move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery” and “include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an
effort to obtain it without court action.”102 If a court order to compel
disclosure or inspection is ignored or obstructed, subsection (b) provides
that:
If a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent—or a
witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails to
obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order
under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is
pending may issue further just orders.103

95. Id. at 1148-49 (quotation marks omitted).
96. See id. at 1149.
97. See id. at 1150.
98. Id.; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1032-33
(10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the removal and destruction of waste on
his property constituted actionable spoliation because the parties had “generated extensive
documentation of the condition of the land before and during remediation”).
99. Turner, 563 F.3d at 1150.
100. Id. at 1149.
101. Id. (quoting Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (7th Cir.
1998)).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1).
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
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The Rule also provides that failure to respond to a request for inspection
can itself justify sanctions, stating that the court may order sanctions if “a
party, after being properly served with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a
request for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections,
or written response.”104
B. Spoliation in Other Jurisdictions
The complexity of the Duty Dilemma becomes evident when cast in
terms of non-Oklahoma spoliation law.105 In contract actions, Oklahoma
adheres to a choice of law rule that states “the nature, validity and
interpretation of a contract is governed by the law where the contract is
made.”106 However, it is only where a contract is silent as to the applicable
state law that the rule arises.107 This is codified in title 15, section 162 of the
Oklahoma Statutes.108 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has established that
the state substantive law specified in a contract will control “as long as the
selected law is not contrary to Oklahoma’s established public policy.”109
And a particular state law may be selected either explicitly or implicitly in a
contract.110 Thus, it is important to understand the variety of approaches to
spoliation and how they depart from the Oklahoma approach.
Suppose a contract specifies that New York law controls. Further,
assume there is nothing about this choice of law provision that offends the
public policy goals of Oklahoma—the location where the bulk of the
contract was performed. In contrast to Oklahoma’s approach, New York

104. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(ii).
105. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska
1986) (finding, contrary to Oklahoma, an independent action for spoliation); Holmes v.
Amerex Rent–A–Car, 710 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 1998) (finding that the same may be found,
given proper circumstances); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio
1993) ( “A cause of action exists in tort for interference with or destruction of
evidence . . . .”).
106. Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 17, 820 P.2d 787, 793; see also Telex
Corp. v. Hamilton, 1978 OK 32, ¶ 8, 576 P.2d 767, 768 (“[T]he general rule of law is that
the law where the contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature, validity,
and interpretation.”).
107. SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, 250 F. Supp. 3d 856, 972 (N.D. Okla. 2017).
108. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2011).
109. Stephenson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 973; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear,
1990 OK 67, ¶ 6 & n.12, 796 P.2d 296, 299 & n.12 (finding that a choice of law provision is
invalid if the chosen law violates a fundamental policy of a state with a greater interest in the
issue, and that state’s law would govern absent the choice of law provision).
110. Stephenson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
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has entertained independent causes of action in tort for spoliation.111 Under
New York law, the tort of intentional spoliation is established by showing
(1) pending or imminent litigation; (2) that the plaintiff-buyer had
knowledge of the pending or imminent litigation; (3) willful destruction of
evidence or destruction designed to frustrate the defendant-seller’s case; (4)
actual disruption of the case; and (5) the plaintiff-buyer’s acts proximately
caused the seller’s damages.112
Negligent spoliation follows the typical duty-breach-damage model.113
The cause of action must evidence “(1) the existence of a duty on
defendant’s part as to plaintiff; (2) a breach of this duty; and (3) injury to
the plaintiff as a result thereof.”114 Many courts look to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals to articulate a negligent spoliation action, which
requires the moving party to prove (1) that litigation is either pending or
reasonably foreseeable; (2) the plaintiff-buyer had actual knowledge of the
pending or imminent litigation; (3) “a duty to preserve evidence arising
from a contract, agreement, statute, administrative rule, voluntary
assumption of duty, or other special circumstances;” (4) spoliation of the
evidence; (5) the evidence that was spoliated by the plaintiff-buyer was
essential to the defendant-seller’s defense in the pending or imminent
action; and (6) damages.115
Although a handful of states have recognized an independent action in
tort for breaching the duty to preserve evidence, most refuse to
acknowledge it. The Tenth Circuit—and Oklahoma specifically—joins the
majority.116 States that have refused to adopt a cause of action in tort for

111. Compare Fada Indus. v. Falchi Bldg. Co., L.P., 730 N.Y.S.2d 827, 840-41 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2001) (holding that both intentional and negligent spoliation can be brought in tort),
with MetLife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc., 753 N.Y.S.2d 272, 279 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (holding that independent actions in tort for spoliation contain too many pitfalls
and are prone to abuse).
112. Fada Indus., 730 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
113. See Ortega v. City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (N.Y. 2007).
114. Fada Indus., 730 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
115. Ortega, 876 N.E.2d at 1193-94 (quoting Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 569 (W.
Va. 2003)).
116. See, e.g., Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 862
(10th Cir. 2005) (finding that Oklahoma does not recognize an independent tort for negligent
spoliation); cf. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986)
(recognizing the tort of “intentional interference with prospective civil action by spoliation
of evidence”); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993)
(recognizing a cause of action against primary and third parties for spoliation); Patel v.
OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., 1999 OK 33, ¶ 46, 987 P.2d 1185, 1202 (“[M]ost of the courts which

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

938

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:923

spoliation have done so for a number of reasons.117 First, they have a
variety of alternative mechanisms by which to deter and compensate for
spoliation, including discovery sanctions and adverse inferences.118 Second,
it is not uncommon for third parties to be the perpetrators of alleged
spoliation, thereby complicating the apportionment of fault.119 Third, and
consistently cited, an independent cause of action in tort interferes with an
individual’s right to dispose his property how he chooses, bringing an
individual and his property within the purview of the court’s enforcement
power.120 Finally, courts explain that an independent tort would likely fail
to recognize exigent circumstances demanding the disposition of the
property, not least of which may include compelling safety justifications.121
Recognition of an independent tort also raises a poignant procedural
issue.122 Despite a general agreement amongst state and federal courts on its
negative implications, it is unsettled whether a claimant must bring and lose
the underlying suit before asserting an independent spoliation claim or
whether the two claims should be brought in the same action.123 For some,
the issue is one of collateral estoppel.124 However, others suggest that once
the merits of the underlying civil action have been ascertained, and the
extent of prejudice caused by the spoliation is revealed, the operative facts
regarding a subsequent action for intentional spoliation are substantially
have considered the issue have refused to recognize spoliation as an independent cause of
action in tort.”).
117. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 837 (D. Kan. 1992)
(listing six reasons why courts refuse to recognize an independent tort).
118. See e.g., id.; Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. La.
1992) (noting that an adverse presumption was a sufficient sanction against the spoliator);
Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 365 (D. Mass. 1991) (deciding to exclude
the evidence rather than dismiss the case and applying these five factors: “(1) whether the
defendant was prejudiced as a result of the [unilateral inspection by the plaintiff]; (2)
whether the prejudice can be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether
the plaintiff was in good faith or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if the evidence is
not excluded”).
119. See Foster, 809 F. Supp at 837.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 837-38. Compare Kent v. Costruzione Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta,
S.p.A., CIV. A. No. 90–2233, 1990 WL 139414, at *7 n.12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 1990) (“Not
until there is a disposition with respect to the underlying civil action can it be determined
whether the destruction of evidence has prejudiced plaintiff.”) with Smith v. Super. Ct., 198
Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a spoliation action should be heard in
conjunction with the underlying claim).
124. Kent, 1990 WL 139414, at *7 n.12.
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different—thus, collateral estoppel is not a bar.125 Nevertheless, many
remain skeptical and insist that a spoliation claim should be juxtaposed
alongside the underlying claim in order to prevent “needless duplication of
effort” and reproduction of the same evidence in subsequent litigation.126
To illustrate the utility of an independent tort for spoliation, courts have
distinguished a “first-party” and “third-party” action.127 Whereas “[t]hirdparty spoliation refers to spoliation by a non-party” to the principal
litigation,128 a first-party spoliator “is a party to the underlying action who
has destroyed or suppressed evidence relevant to the plaintiff’s claims
against [that] party.”129 The key distinction is that a third-party spoliator is
“not alleged to have committed the underlying tort as to which the lost or
destroyed evidence related.”130 Jurisdictions that recognize independent
actions for spoliation have found that such actions are necessary to pin
liability on third parties that would otherwise be beyond reach.131 They are
designed to fill the “open space in the law where a plaintiff otherwise
would be left without a remedy.”132
Even outside of Oklahoma, protecting the moving party’s right to inspect
the evidence and prepare a defense for trial is the fundamental purpose of
spoliation sanctions.133 In Kirkland, the plaintiff’s sued the New York City
Housing Authority (NYCHA) and a stove manufacturer when an allegedly
defective stove caused the plaintiff’s death.134 NYCHA impleaded a thirdparty defendant and subsequently had the stove removed from the unit.135
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
127. Cook v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 810 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing
Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 848-49 (D.C. 1998)).
128. Howard Reg'l Health Sys. v. Gordon, 952 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ind. 2011).
129. Mendez v. Hovensa, L.L.C., Civil No. 02–0169, 2008 WL 803115, at *7 (D. V.I.
Mar. 24, 2008) (quoting Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1173 n.5 (Conn.
2006)).
130. Id. at *7 n.1 (quoting Rizzuto, 905 A.2d at 1173 n.5).
131. Cook, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 157-588.
132. Id. at 157 (citing Holmes, 710 A.2d at 849). The court in Holmes went on to explain
that “[b]ecause sanctions may not be levied upon a disinterested, independent third party, an
independent tort action for negligent spoliation of evidence is the only means to deter the
negligent destruction of evidence and to compensate the aggrieved party for its destruction.”
Holmes, 710 A.2d at 849 (quoting John K. Stipancich, Comment, The Negligent Spoliation
of Evidence: An Independent Tort Action May Be the Only Acceptable Alternative, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1135, 1141-42 (1992)).
133. See Kirkland v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 666 N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
134. Id. at 610.
135. Id.
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There was no evidence that NYCHA had made any attempt to preserve the
evidence, and dismissal of the third-party claim was therefore deemed an
appropriate sanction.136 However, the court emphasized an important
principle:137 The purpose of sanctioning the spoliation of evidence, whether
intentional or negligent, is to encourage future litigants to apprise offended
parties of the evidence, give them an opportunity to inspect it, and form
their defense.138
In situations like these, sanctions are appropriate only “inasmuch as
[they] leave[] the offended party prejudicially bereft of appropriate means
to confront a claim with incisive evidence and turns trials into speculative
spectacles based on rank ‘swearing contests.’”139 The Kirkland court
ultimately resolved the spoliation issue against NYCHA because its
disposal of the stove made it unavailable for critical examination and
analysis by the third party defendant.140 NYCHA, as it turned out, had
failed to make its own inspection for the six years after the action’s
commencement.141 The failure to avail itself of the evidence was, in effect,
“a problem of its own making.”142 For a party bearing the burden to prove
spoliation, “[t]he gravamen of th[e] burden is a showing of prejudice.”143
Prejudice is a steep burden to show.144 It requires the moving party to
demonstrate that the absence of the evidence “fatally compromise[s] the
defense . . . or leave[s] the [party] without the means to defend the
action.”145 In Kirschen, for example, the tenant of an apartment unit filed
suit against the defendants for allegedly causing damage to his apartment.146
Before commencing the action, the plaintiff renovated and dramatically
changed portions of the unit that had allegedly been damaged by the
defendants.147 The defendants retorted that this conduct amounted to
spoliation of the evidence, but the court held that the plaintiff’s acts of

136. Id. at 611.
137. See id. at 612.
138. See id.
139. Id.
at
612
(quoting
Hoenig,
Products
Liability: Impeachment
Exception; Spoliation Update, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1993, at 6).
140. Id. at 612.
141. Id. at 613.
142. Id.
143. Kirschen v. Marino, 792 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
144. See id.
145. Id. (quoting Favish v. Tepler, 741 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)).
146. Id. at 171.
147. Id.
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renovating the apartment were not enough to support a spoliation claim.148
The defendants could not prove that they were significantly prejudiced by
the alteration of the disputed portions of the unit because “[b]oth the
plaintiff and the defendants had numerous photographs of the apartment” in
its prior state.149 The court noted that the defendants were uniquely
positioned, as the prior tenants, “to testify to their version of [the unit’s]
condition at the time they vacated.”150 Ultimately, the circumstances were
insufficient to demonstrate severe prejudice to the presentation of a
defense.151
C. The Duty to Mitigate Damages
The United States Supreme Court set forth the modern duty to mitigate
in Warren v. Stoddart, a breach of contract action concerning the credit
terms of a book order.152 In Warren, the court explained that when a buyer
expects to receive the benefit of a contract, “and can save himself from a
loss arising from a breach of it at a trifling expense or with reasonable
exertions, it is his duty to do it, and he can charge the delinquent with such
damages only as with reasonable endeavors and expense he could not
prevent.”153 Thus, a buyer must make reasonable efforts to mitigate his
injury when the seller breaches a material element of a contract of sale.154
He will not be allowed to recover an amount beyond what his reasonable
efforts would have avoided had he made such efforts.155 Under typical
pleading standards, the defendant in an action has the burden of pleading
duty to mitigate as an affirmative defense.156 The analysis employs a

148. Id. at 172.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 172-73.
152. Warren v. Stoddart, 105 U.S. 224, 229 (1881).
153. Id.; see, e.g., Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1867).
154. See, e.g., United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf Holdings Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1231
(10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the defendant has the burden of asserting and proving
mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense); Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72, 7677 (1863) (“Damages for breaches of contract are only those which are incidental to, and
directly caused by, the breach, and may reasonably be presumed to have entered into the
contemplation of the parties; and not speculative profits, or accidental or consequential
losses.”); Bailey v. J.L. Roebuck Co., 1929 OK 96, ¶ 3, 275 P. 329, 330 (restating the
principle of mitigation).
155. Bailey, ¶ 3, 275 P. at 330.
156. Oklahoma law, for example, suggests that the burden of proving that damages
should have been less is on the defendant. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Grant, 505
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reasonableness test.157 Therefore, where a seller has materially breached a
contract, it is the obligation of the buyer to “render his injury as light as
possible.”158 He may not recover any amount that would have been avoided
had he simply acted as a reasonably prudent person faced with similar
circumstances.159
The duty to mitigate takes on different hues depending on the timing of
the mitigating conduct.160 When the buyer’s negligent conduct occurs after
the seller has already committed an actionable breach of contract, the
buyer’s failure to mitigate damages is labeled “avoidable consequences.”161
On the other hand, negligent conduct that occurs prior to the seller’s
actionable breach, and contributes to the commission of the breach, is
“contributory negligence.”162 This type of negligent conduct by the buyer is
of the sort that, taken together with the seller’s negligent conduct, is the
proximate cause of the buyer’s injury.163 Avoidable consequences and
contributory negligence both refer to the negligent conduct of the buyer but
manifest themselves at different points in the causal timeline. When the
seller of a defective machine breaches the sale contract, the buyer must take
reasonable precautions to prevent causing additional damage.164 Any
F.3d 1013, 1028 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that Oklahoma state law requires defendants to
carry the burden under the diminution of value rule).
157. Sackett v. Rose, 1916 OK 2, ¶ 14, 154 P. 1177, 1180 (“The question in such cases is
always whether the necessary acts to mitigate the damages were reasonable, having regard to
all the circumstances of the particular case.”).
158. Id. (quoting Uhlig v. Barnum, 61 N.W. 749 (Neb. 1895).
159. Id. (quoting Uhlig, 61 N.W. 749).
160. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1230 (D.N.M.
2004) (emphasizing that the theory of avoidable consequences concerns the mitigation of
damages that arise after the commission of a tort or a breach of contract (quoting Acme
Cigarette Servs. v. Gallegos, 577 P.2d 885, 891 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978))); see also W. PAGE
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 458 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984) (“The rule of avoidable consequences comes into play after a legal wrong has
occurred, but while some damages may still be averted, and bars recovery only for such
damages.”).
161. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (quoting Gallegos, 577 P.2d at 891
(Hernandez, J., specially concurring)).
162. Thomason v. Pilger, 2005 OK 10, ¶ 10, 112 P.3d 1162, 1166.
163. Id.
164. Leigh King Forstman, Mitigating Damages: Reasonable Versus Unreasonable
Actions (Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. Winter 2004 Convention Reference Materials, Feb.
2004), Westlaw WINTER2004 ATLA-CLE 269 ("Regardless of how the injury occurred or
whose negligence caused the injury, the plaintiff must take reasonable steps after being
injured; if not, the plaintiff's recovery can be barred or reduced if the plaintiff's conduct is
deemed unreasonable.").
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damage caused by the buyer’s failure to take such precautions is
unrecoverable.165 As a result, the hypothetical buyer B has a compelling
reason to salvage the hydraulic equipment on his new disc—failure to do so
may prevent him from recovering any losses caused by his failure to timely
salvage the parts and commence work before the weather turns sour.
The duty to mitigate is not exclusively the stuff of torts.166 Such a duty
also arises in breach of contract actions.167 Moreover, when circumstances
compel a plaintiff to mitigate damages, “it is the choice of the Plaintiff, not
the Defendant[], as to which remedies the Plaintiff will seek.”168 When the
choice of one remedy over another is the product of business judgment,
courts afford deference because they “cannot willingly dictate to a business
what the wise and prudent course of action would be.”169 Thus, when the
defendant-seller objects to the remedy chosen by the injured buyer, courts
are quick to quip, “[T]he person whose wrong forced the choice cannot
complain that one rather than the other was chosen.”170 An aggrieved party
is not required to exalt the interests of the breaching party merely to
appease its hypocritical distaste for the plaintiff’s mitigation preference.171
Adding further complexity to the Duty Dilemma is the last clear chance
doctrine—the ancestral cousin of the duty to mitigate.172 Although it
addresses problems of proximate cause, the doctrine serves as a useful
guide for non-traditional duty dilemmas—the type where the plaintiff-buyer
is the alleged spoliator.173 It was developed to acknowledge the principle
“that the law holds liable for injury those who are responsible for the

165. Id.
166. See Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (quoting Gallegos, 577 P.2d at 891
(Hernandez, J., specially concurring)).
167. Id.; see also Hidalgo Props., Inc. v. Wachovia Mortg. Co., 617 F.2d 196, 200 (10th
Cir. 1980); Gallegos, 577 P.2d at 891 (Hernandez, J., specially concurring) (“It is well
settled that a party must use reasonable diligence to mitigate the damages about to be
suffered either from tort or breach of contract.” (citing Mitchell v. Jones, 138 P.2d 522, 524
(N.M. 1943))).
168. Walshe v. Zabors, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1086-87 (D. Colo. 2016) (“[T]he choice of
remedies belongs to the one who has been defrauded, and may not be forced upon him by
the wrongdoer.” (citing H & K Auto. Supply Co. v. Moore & Co., 657 P.2d 986, 988 (Colo.
App. 1982))).
169. In re WPRV-TV, Inc., 102 B.R. 231, 234 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988).
170. Id. (quoting In re Kellett Aircraft Corp., 186 F.2d 197, 198–99 (3d Cir. 1950)).
171. Id. (quoting Kellett, 186 F.2d at 199).
172. See Okla. Ry. Co. v. Overton, 1932 OK 353, ¶ 7, 12 P.2d 537, 538 (quoting Pa. R.R.
v. Swartzel, 17 F.2d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 1927)).
173. See id.
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proximate cause of the injury.”174 Nevertheless, the doctrine speaks to
situations where a party, not initially privy to another’s negligent conduct,
finds himself in a position where injury to the other can be avoided by his
own reasonable conduct.175 Put another way, when party X finds party Y “in
a place of danger” resulting from Y’s own negligent conduct, and X has the
“last clear chance” to prevent Y from incurring harm, X must use ordinary
care to prevent that harm.176 It is irrelevant how Y found himself in danger;
the doctrine notes that X’s failure to use ordinary care to prevent Y’s injury
is the proximate cause of Y’s injury.177 Although the doctrine was embraced
as an answer to specific problems of proximate cause in complex causation
fact patterns, it provides a unique lens through which to view the Duty
Dilemma.
III. Which Court? The Procedural Problem with Spoliation
State choice-of-law rules dictate the legal risk landscape between
contracting parties.178 This is because each choice-of-law determination is
based largely upon the parties’ expectations regarding the contract and how
its choice-of-law clause will apply.179 Thus, the essential inquiry in choiceof-law questions is whether the issue is substantive or procedural.180 Parties
are “empowered to make contractual choice-of-law provisions,” and as a
result, the expectation of the parties regarding the applicability of those
provisions is “a significant factor in the determination of whether an issue is
substantive or procedural for choice-of-law purposes.”181
Accordingly, the Erie Doctrine is deeply embedded in spoliation
doctrine.182 It is well settled that a federal court sitting in diversity applies
the substantive law of the forum state,183 but there is disagreement among
the courts as to whether spoliation is a substantive or procedural issue.184 If
spoliation is conclusively procedural in nature, the Erie Doctrine requires
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kan. Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1126
(10th Cir. 1999).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 127 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997).
183. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
184. See generally KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 18.
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that federal courts in diversity apply federal procedural rules.185 However,
making a proper distinction between “substance” and “procedure” can
present a daunting task, as “[t]he line between [the two] shifts as the legal
context changes.”186 The majority of circuits, however, hold that spoliation
is procedural in nature and apply federal law for spoliation sanctions.187
The law of spoliation is primarily considered procedural because it draws
upon the inherent powers of the courts. In Adkins, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that federal law prevailed in spoliation cases because the
authority to impose sanctions for spoliated evidence arises “from a court’s
inherent power to control the judicial process,” rather than from the forum
state’s substantive law.188 Also, a spoliation determination is inherently
evidentiary in nature, and federal courts generally apply their own
evidentiary principles in diversity.189 Where the bad faith of a litigant is in
question and the imposition of sanctions is looming, such a determination
“reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself” and brings it within the
purview of federal law.190 Of course, if a federal court determines that the
outcome would be the same whether federal or state law is used, the choice
of law analysis is inconsequential.191
Conversely, some courts have held that the pre-litigation duty to preserve
evidence is substantive.192 In State Farm, a defective dishwasher was
alleged to be the proximate cause of a fire.193 The court found that State
Farm breached its duty to preserve material evidence when it allowed the
dishwasher to be destroyed, and ordered the exclusion of all evidence
related to the dishwasher.194 Relying on Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, a key

185. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
186. Id. at 471.
187. See, e.g., Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 2009); Silvestri v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying the federal law of spoliation
despite the fact that both parties agreed that the law of New York—where the incident
occurred—applied).
188. 554 F.3d at 652 (quoting Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 590).
189. King v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003).
190. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991); Peshlakai v. Ruiz, 39 F.
Supp. 3d 1264, 1343 (D.N.M. 2014) (noting that the Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed
whether federal law governs spoliation issues and deciding to err with the majority).
191. See KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 18.
192. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160, 162 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
193. Id. at 161.
194. Id. at 163.
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component of the Erie doctrine, the State Farm court found that the duty to
preserve evidence is substantive, and therefore applied Illinois state law.195
Because allegations of spoliation in the context of the Duty Dilemma
generally point to conduct that occurred prior to litigation, the court’s
sanctioning power must extend to the pre-commencement period if
spoliation is to be treated as procedural. Without a court order or pending
discovery request, the court’s authority to police itself is potentially limited.
Reaching early-stage spoliation may require the courts to enter the
substantive realm. If, however, courts can maintain that the power to police
itself extends to that period when litigation is reasonably foreseeable, then a
procedural classification of spoliation remains defensible.
Thus, the substantive problem of spoliation: if a jurisdiction does not
recognize an independent duty to preserve evidence, must it conclude that
spoliation is purely procedural? The refusal to recognize a tort action for
failure to preserve evidence may infer that the courts’ ability to police itself
is limited to conduct already within the purview of litigation. Such a result
would further complicate the Duty Dilemma, especially where the plaintiff
is the spoliator. Because the plaintiff-buyer brings suit and is the first to
reasonably foresee litigation, the law, as it is, would require the defendant
to get a court order against the buyer when litigation hasn’t even
commenced yet. This absurdity illustrates the choice of law issue. For
spoliation to be procedural, the courts must have clear authority to police
the conduct. If the circumstances appear to limit the courts’ authority—
because the conduct occurred before the matter was brought within the
court’s jurisdiction—then that form of spoliation may warrant substantive
treatment. Resolving the choice of law problem is beyond the scope of this
Comment, but it is important to note that the Duty Dilemma presents
spoliation in a context that may demand substantive rather than procedural
classification. Regardless, the applicable law governing the spoliation claim
will turn on the choice of law classification, and the Duty Dilemma must be
resolved just the same.
IV. Mariposa Farms and the Unresolved Duty Dilemma
A plaintiff-buyer may successfully invoke the “duty to mitigate” as a
defense to spoliation as long as the spoliator gives the moving party a
sufficient opportunity to inspect the evidence prior to making an

195. Id. at 162.
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alteration.196 In Mariposa, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged deficiencies in a
cow-milking system manufactured by the defendants, and brought an action
for financial losses resulting from the equipment’s failure to function
properly.197 After the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff significantly
altered the system in response to an expert’s recommendations, hoping to
make it operational. These alterations occurred nearly six weeks after they
were recommended, but at no point was the defendant provided an
opportunity to inspect the system itself.198 The court, frowning upon the
plaintiff’s conduct, reasoned that its unilateral alterations deprived the
defendant of the opportunity to “gather direct evidence with which to
support its defense,” thereby preventing it from formulating an argument
for trial that it otherwise would have been able to make.199
It is important to note, however, that the plaintiff preserved the parts and
major components of the milking system, took photographs of the
alterations, and directed its own expert to test the system before the
change.200 Nevertheless, the court held that this was not enough to avoid a
spoliation sanction.201 “[S]uch evidence,” it held, “is insufficient to preserve
[defendant’s] right to inspect and to have its own expert test the system as it
existed prior to any alterations being made.”202
The plaintiff rebutted the defendant’s subsequent spoliation claim by
arguing that the alterations were made in performance of its duty to mitigate
196. See Mariposa Farms, LLC v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., No. CIV 03-0779 JC/LAM,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49951, at *9 (D.N.M. Feb. 3, 2005).
197. Id. at *4-5.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *6-7.
200. Id. at *7.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see also Barnett v. Simmons, 2008 OK 100, ¶ 19, 197 P.3d 12, 19 (finding that
“an examination reasonably foreseeably destructive of evidence done without notice to
opposing counsel which does result in destruction of evidence should expose a party to
severe sanction” (citing Holm-Waddle v. Hawley, 1998 OK 53, ¶ 10, 967 P.2d 1180, 1182)).
Addressing a plaintiff-buyer’s own use of an expert, the court in Holm-Waddle stated that:
When an expert employed by a party or his attorney conducts an examination
reasonably foreseeably destructive without notice to opposing counsel and such
examination results in either negligent or intentional destruction of evidence,
thereby rendering it impossible for an opposing party to obtain a fair trial; it
appears that the Court would not only be empowered, but required to take
appropriate action, either to dismiss the suit altogether, or to ameliorate the illgotten advantage.
Holm-Waddle, ¶ 10, 967 P.2d at 1182 (quoting Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547-48
(W.D. Okla. 1979)).
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damages.203 The court rejected this argument, stating that the plaintiff’s
“duty to mitigate damages and its duty to preserve evidence [were] not
mutually exclusive.”204 It further reasoned that the plaintiff could have
mitigated damages while still allowing the defendant to inspect the system
before it was changed.205 In response, the plaintiff argued that the
defendant’s personnel who visited the dairy farm before the alterations were
made to the milking system had ample opportunity to inspect it on those
visits.206 The court rejected this argument as well, stating that the personnel
visits were for routine service and maintenance rather than for litigation
purposes.207
Because the plaintiff could not show that the defendant should have
known to use these visits to inspect and test the system prior to impending
litigation and alterations, the mitigation defense was denied.208
Nevertheless, the timing of the alterations was a significant factor in the
court’s decision.209 Because the alterations occurred after the suit was
commenced rather than before, the court noted that spoliation that occurs
after commencement is inherently more blameworthy.210
The court also resolved the prejudice element of the spoliation analysis
against the plaintiff.211 Although the plaintiff had kept the component parts,
the court found that the complexity of the milking system required that it be
maintained in its original state to facilitate a fair inspection by the
defendant.212 Ultimately, the alterations to the milking system “depriv[ed]
[the defendant] of direct, objective and independent evidence of the vacuum
pressure in the system prior to the modification.”213 Despite the severity of
the plaintiff’s spoliation, the court chose to exclude the evidence rather than
dismiss the suit.214
This is the first and only case in the Tenth Circuit to visit—albeit in an
unpublished opinion—the competing duties issue. Although it purports to
resolve the conflict by pronouncing them not mutually exclusive, its
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Mariposa Farms, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49951, at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *10-12.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *13.
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holding leaves many aspects of spoliation and tort law largely unexplored.
The time is ripe to resolve the Duty Dilemma.
Whether or not an independent action for spoliation exists, the buyer of a
defective machine has a duty to preserve evidence as soon as litigation
becomes reasonably foreseeable.215 This is especially true of a plaintiffspoliator who is the first party to know that litigation is in fact on the
horizon. Once the buyer discovers that the machine is defective, it will
presumably begin the process of rectifying the transaction, giving notice to
the seller and scheduling necessary repairs. Notice is essential. If the
plaintiff-buyer does not provide the seller with an adequate opportunity to
inspect the defective machine, thereby failing to give the seller a sufficient
reason to believe that litigation is on the horizon, the prejudice element of
the spoliation claim will be almost automatic.
The duty to mitigate and the duty to preserve evidence are not mutually
exclusive. However, the burden is on the plaintiff-buyer to provide the
seller an adequate opportunity to inspect the evidence because it is the
plaintiff-buyer that controls whether breach of contract litigation will
commence. Refer back to the original hypothetical. Spoliation and
mitigation issues collide in unique circumstances. When buyer B discovers
that the disc he bought from seller S is defective, there is a small window
for either party to make necessary repairs. Remember, the weather—and in
other cases, the economy—is a limiting factor that affects whether B has
time to seek repairs and whether S has time to perform them. Therefore, B
must be wary. A strategic miscalculation resulting in the disposal or
alteration of the disc before S has had time to inspect it will likely result in a
spoliation sanction—and B’s duty-to-mitigate defense will fail under
Mariposa.
Therefore, the underlying theme of the Duty Dilemma is that the duty to
mitigate only becomes a viable defense if it was in fact reasonable for B to
mitigate its damages. Because reasonableness informs the duty to mitigate,
it must also inform the Duty Dilemma. The opportunity to inspect is the key
determinant. Whether it was reasonable for B to mitigate its economic
damages by altering and repurposing the hydraulic system on the new disc
will depend on whether S’s opportunity to inspect the disc—prior to
alteration—was sufficient to allow it to form a defense for future litigation.
Borrowing from long-standing tort law, the plaintiff-buyer who finds
itself wrestling with the Duty Dilemma has the last clear chance to avoid a
215. See Henning v. Union Pac. R.R., 530 F.3d 1206, 1220 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 505 F.3d 1013, 1032 (10th Cir. 2007)).
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spoliation issue. And the duty not to spoliate implies an underlying duty to
provide for a proper inspection of the evidence. As long as the seller has
had a reasonable opportunity to inspect, the showing of prejudice will fail
and spoliation will be rendered a non-issue. As a result, the burden is on the
buyer to provide a legally sufficient opportunity to inspect. What exactly
does this look like? The case law analyzing inspection requirements
through the spoliation lens suggests that the opportunity to inspect is best
characterized as an opportunity to develop a defense for litigation.216 In the
competing duties context, this must give the inspecting party reasonable
notice that the inspection should be performed with future litigation in
mind.
There are several types of inspection that, despite substantial compliance
and cooperation by the plaintiff-buyer, fail to apprise the seller of
impending litigation. An inspection performed in the normal course of
business, perhaps according to routine maintenance obligations stipulated in
the contract of sale, may not give rise to the level of notice necessary to
constitute proper notice. Suppose the sale contract between B and S requires
that S perform routine maintenance inspections each quarter and conduct
necessary repairs. It will be inappropriate for B to characterize one of these
routine inspections as an adequate inspection for spoliation purposes. The
determinative question is whether the opportunity for inspection is
sufficient to inform the inspector of impending litigation and provide a
meaningful opportunity to collect information necessary to support its
argument at trial. Relying on a mere routine inspection to notify the seller
of impending litigation, without more, is not enough to place the possibility
of litigation within the reasonable foreseeability of the defendant-seller.
It is important to keep in mind that the essential element of spoliation is
prejudice to the moving party.217 Prejudice is generally cast in terms of lack
of access to evidence—causing the defendant to botch its defense for
trial.218 Underlying every spoliation claim is an inherent causation element.
But for the lack of access to relevant evidence, the seller would have been
able to effectively controvert the allegations of the breach of contract
action. In the Duty Dilemma context, the duty to mitigate damages coopts
the “adequacy of inspection” issue. Suppose B does not salvage the parts
216. See Kirkland v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 666 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(holding that the purpose of inspections is to provide an opportunity for the inspecting party
to form the defense it would have been able to make had the evidence been preserved).
217. Kirschen v. Marino, 792 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (noting that “the
gravamen of [a spoliation claim] is a showing of prejudice”).
218. Id.
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from the disc, and instead leaves it in the barn to collect dust. Production
grinds to a halt, and B begins to incur substantial economic damages. In the
subsequent breach of contract action, the issue of damages will be
compounded by B’s failure to mitigate damages. The question then will be
whether it was reasonable for B not to salvage the parts from the new disc
and cause preventable economic loss. Of course, S’s argument will be that it
was not.
In a world where B has not altered the new disc to mitigate his losses, S
will likely invoke the duty to mitigate as a defense to B’s claims of
economic loss. In this world, B will be left wishing he had salvaged the
parts for re-use in his old disc—but it will be too late. Who, between B and
S, should be responsible for this loss? All other things equal, had S
performed on the contract, the loss would not have occurred. B would have
no outside cause precluding the realization of his full economic potential.
The new disc would have been operable, and his farming operation would
have continued unimpeded. The answer to this question relies on traditional
concepts of reasonableness. It would be unreasonable for B to simply scrap
the new disc and refurbish the old one without providing S an adequate
opportunity to inspect it. It would also be unreasonable for B to rely on a
contractually required maintenance inspection to justify an unannounced
alteration to the disc at the cusp of litigation—when only B knows that it is
imminent. Both situations would justify a spoliation sanction, but in neither
of them would it be reasonable to mitigate damages, preemptively, by
salvaging the new disc. Consequently, the reasonability of the plaintiffbuyer’s conduct determines whether the duty to preserve evidence and the
duty to mitigate damages are mutually exclusive or not.
Consider the following: if B gives S ample opportunity to inspect the disc
and vocalizes his discontent with the conduct alleged to constitute the
breach, then any subsequent alteration will be a reasonable mitigation of the
damages. S’s failure to act upon a reasonable opportunity to inspect will
shift the fault to S and absolve B of any potential spoliation claim. B bought
the disc, B owns the disc, and B has a right to dispose of his property as he
chooses. If S does not diligently seek his own legal protection by acting
reasonably and inspecting when given the opportunity, B should be held
harmless when his own protective conduct—salvaging the new disc and
getting the farm running again—ultimately precludes S from forming a
defense for trial.219 The law purporting to resolve the Duty Dilemma should
not allow S to have his cake and eat it too. The spoliation claim against B
219. See Kirkland, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
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for deconstructing the disc is only viable as long as S acts reasonably
himself. A defendant-seller’s unclean hands can and should render a
spoliation claim untenable. Once the opportunity to inspect is given, S must
seize it.
The duty to mitigate damages is generally an affirmative defense
reserved for defendants seeking to attribute some of the total damages to the
negligent conduct of the plaintiff.220 As a result, the duty to mitigate is a
sword of Damocles that shapes plaintiffs’ behavior before and during
litigation. Attempting to be the law’s reasonably prudent person, plaintiffs
seek to minimize their damages by taking reasonable steps to ensure that
damages are not exacerbated. Plaintiff-buyers who have been sold a
defective product should be wary. The law has conditioned them to
minimize damages when prudence and reason would require it. But when a
breach of contract action is imminent, plaintiff-buyers should resist
mitigating damages until it is absolutely reasonable to do so. This
‘reasonableness’ standard is not, like the duty to mitigate, a reference to the
plaintiff’s obligation to take steps to avoid damages. Instead,
reasonableness in the context of the Duty Dilemma should be couched in
terms of spoliation. Providing an adequate inspection is pivotal. Only once
an opportunity to inspect has been given is mitigation reasonable. It is the
key that unlocks the duty to reasonably mitigate damages.
Some may suggest an alternative solution to the Dilemma. A spoliationcentric view might contend that the Duty Dilemma is resolved by relying
purely on the dictates of spoliation doctrine. Such an alternative
construction would posit that the duty to mitigate damages is a legal leisure
that ceases to exist in the spoliation context; spoliation doctrine leaves no
room for the duty to mitigate. The purpose of spoliation is to preserve
essential evidence for trial at a time when a defense has yet to be made.
Therefore, the duty to mitigate damages does not apply if it requires
altering relevant, material evidence necessary to allow the defendant-seller
to form its defense. There are a number of reasons why this alternative fails.
First, spoliation is a dormant issue in all litigation. Although hindsight
successfully illuminates key moments when the duty to preserve was
actually the strongest, a theory that attempts to resolve the Duty Dilemma
must take into account the prospective nature of transactional negotiations.
When parties agree to make a deal involving the underlying object of future
spoliation litigation, it is presumed that those parties intend to benefit by the
terms of the deal. They expect that the contract will be honored and that the
220. See Sackett v. Rose, 1916 OK 2, ¶ 14, 154 P. 1177, 1180.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/6

2019]

COMMENT

953

opposing party will act in good faith. In some cases, unfortunately, these
expectations are not met, and litigation ensues. But the commencement of
litigation should not clip the plaintiff-buyer’s wings. If the law expects
plaintiffs to both preserve evidence and mitigate damages, something has to
give. To realize the benefit of its bargain, the plaintiff-buyer should
mitigate its damages, even if that means committing otherwise prima facie
spoliation. Any other approach would essentially condone breaches of
contract without any corresponding effort to soften the blow for the victims,
amounting to forfeiture of the plaintiff-buyer’s property.
Second, the duty to mitigate damages is of equivalent legal status as
spoliation and should not be discarded when the two collide. Because
spoliation has the potential to shape the entire landscape of litigation, there
is a temptation to elevate it to a higher priority than the duty to mitigate.
But there is no compelling reason to do so. The duty to mitigate damages
shapes plaintiffs’ conduct in all types of litigation, not just those involving
spoliation issues. If a plaintiff fails to act reasonably and mitigate its
damages, it will find a defendant lurking eagerly to prey on its misstep. To
avoid this and protect business interests, society requires plaintiffs to
minimize the damage when reasonable prudence would allow it. An
approach that places the duty to mitigate on the backburner would condone
economic loss in circumstances where that loss could be avoided.
Finally, the last clear chance doctrine articulates the importance of
mitigation in the context of spoliation and suggests that a plaintiff-buyer
has more than a duty to mitigate damages; because of its unique position in
litigation, it has a broad duty to avoid harm at all material stages of
litigation. Recall that the last clear chance doctrine is a long-standing
approach to negligence law that requires defendants to prevent harm to
others even when they are the sole proprietors of their own misfortunes.221
When the duty to preserve evidence collides with the duty to mitigate
damages, the plaintiff-buyer is often saddled with the prospect of economic
loss as a result of the defendant-seller’s misconduct. Prior to the
commencement of litigation, the buyer has the “first clear chance” to
apprise the seller of impending litigation and provide an opportunity for
inspection. Armed with the resources necessary to avoid imminent
economic loss, the buyer also has the “last clear chance” to prevent the
amplification of the harm after the defendant has breached the contract.
Thus, the concept of the last clear chance (and its contrapositive—the first
221. See Okla. Ry. Co. v. Overton, 1932 OK 353, ¶ 7, 12 P.2d 537, 538 (quoting Pa. R.R.
v. Swartzel, 17 F.2d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 1927)).
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clear chance) fundamentally ties the duty to preserve to the duty to mitigate.
By characterizing the Duty Dilemma as a series of legally significant events
where the plaintiff-buyer has the last clear chance, at multiple stages, to
avoid unnecessary harm, the resolution of the Dilemma becomes clearly a
plaintiff-oriented endeavor.
Although this is a counter-intuitive result—admittedly, it was the
defendant-seller who breached the contract—the nature of spoliation
doctrine and the duty to mitigate inherently shifts the burden to the
plaintiff-buyer. The buyer’s decision to commence a breach of contract suit
sets the stage. The foreseeability of litigation, the first prong of the
spoliation analysis, is at the mercy of the buyer’s whims. As a result, the
point at which the duty to preserve evidence arises, a thing that is generally
not precisely knowable, is in fact precisely knowable by the plaintiff-buyer
who is contemplating the future lawsuit. This places the onus squarely on
the buyer to preserve the relevant evidence and provide the seller an
adequate opportunity to inspect it. No party to the litigation—besides the
plaintiff-buyer—knows which evidence will be necessary, or which
inspection opportunity will be the last. Accordingly, no party is better
positioned to contain the amount of harm than the buyer. The inescapable
conclusion is that the plaintiff-buyer has the exclusive duty to reconcile the
duty to preserve and the duty to mitigate.
Mariposa Farms got one thing right. The duty to preserve evidence and
the duty to mitigate are not mutually exclusive. With sufficient notice and
opportunity to inspect, altering the evidence in mitigation of damages can
become reasonable. However, the court missed on an opportunity to fully
articulate the solution to the Duty Dilemma. By holding that the plaintiff’s
preservation of component parts, photographs and expert test results were
not enough to avoid a spoliation sanction, the court effectively took the
power to mitigate spoliation damages away from plaintiffs.222 It had an
opportunity to take the next step in resolving the Duty Dilemma but left
much to be desired.
It is inevitable that plaintiff-buyers in the position of buyer A or
Mariposa Farms will find a defendant-seller unresponsive to its opportunity
222. See Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 503, 507 (M.D. Penn. 1996). In Maytag, a
fire, allegedly caused by a defective microwave, damaged a substantial part of the plaintiff’s
home. Id. at 503. While the plaintiffs preserved the microwave, the electric outlet and
wiring, and took photographs of the scene, the court held that the renovation of the damaged
areas precluded Maytag from examining other possible explanations for the cause of the fire.
Id. at 507. The opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiffs on the veracity of the preserved
evidence was deemed an insufficient substitute for an independent investigation. Id.
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to inspect. Furthermore, it is also conceivable that a notice to inspect will
catch a defendant-seller at a time when it cannot perform an inspection and
the plaintiff-buyer has no time to wait. When time is of the essence, and
economic loss is imminent, plaintiff-buyers should not be forced between a
rock and a hard place. The law must bend when circumstances demand
flexibility. Plaintiff-buyers who have no choice but to mitigate economic
loss by altering and repurposing evidence should be encouraged to take
photographs, preserve component parts, and retain an expert to test the
object. In certain cases, the court may find that these efforts can adequately
protect defendants and give them a sufficient basis to form a defense.223
Needless to say, it is likely that in certain circumstances, particular
objects will not be conducive to the buyer-plaintiff’s attempts to mitigate
spoliation damages. The complexity or uniqueness of a machine might
preclude the possibility of adequately protecting the defendant-seller’s
opportunity to prepare a defense. The theory upon which a party intends to
base its defense may require eliminating alternative causal explanations and
therefore require a comprehensive investigation of the damaged items or
areas.224
Mariposa Farms, it seems, may have arrived at the correct conclusion
despite employing limited reasoning. Although it did not consider whether
buyers in the plaintiff’s position could ever adequately protect the
defendant-seller in the way it chooses to alter the evidence, the court gave a
perfunctory explanation as to the insufficiency of the buyer’s photos,
records, and testing. This should be treated as one of the central tenets of
the Duty Dilemma analysis. When the plaintiff-buyer has unilaterally
altered the primary evidence in mitigation of damages, but it has preserved
component parts, taken photographs, and performed before-and-after
testing, has the defendant been prejudiced to an extent that warrants
spoliation sanctions? This case-by-case analysis is best left for the courts to
resolve. Ultimately, though, it is a question that should inform the Duty
Dilemma and shape buyers’ and sellers’ conduct before and after litigation.
The final wrinkle in the Duty Dilemma is timing—namely, when exactly
did the spoliation occur? As the case law shows, it is common for
alterations to be made in violation of a discovery request after the
commencement of litigation.225 In those cases, the “foreseeability of
223. Kirschen, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (finding that a substantial renovation of a previously
damaged apartment did not prejudice the movant because photographs had been taken and
the movant was the prior tenant).
224. See Howell, 168 F.R.D. at 507.
225. Barnett v. Simmons, 2008 OK 100, ¶ 17-18, 197 P.3d 12, 19.
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litigation” prong is useless—litigation has already begun. As Mariposa
Farms shows, spoliation that occurs after the commencement of litigation is
particularly egregious.226 The explanation is simple. Litigation has
commenced and has presumably revealed to the parties which evidence will
be relevant to the plaintiff’s argument. Should that evidence be altered in
the wake of a litigation hold or discovery request, bad faith is a likely
player.
It is not quite as simple when evidence is altered prior to
commencement. Should parties to future litigation become locked in
negotiations over repairs or maintenance inspections due to a breach of
contract, the fluidity of the legal status of such negotiations only adds to the
uncertainty. Again, only the plaintiff-buyer truly knows when litigation is
on the horizon. But that is precisely why the Duty Dilemma is so unique. It
presents itself at the cusp of litigation after the contract has been breached
and amidst the turmoil that follows. There are no discovery requests, no
court orders, and in some cases, not even the necessary scintilla of evidence
suggesting to the defendant-seller that litigation is approaching. There is
nothing but two disgruntled parties attempting to rectify the breach of a
contract of sale. That is why Mariposa Farms can only take the Duty
Dilemma so far in its quest for reconciliation. It dealt with alterations made
after the commencement of litigation. The timing of the spoliation
considered in Mariposa only captured part of the picture, and only that part
of the picture that was already somewhat decipherable. The Duty
Dilemma’s most pressing issues present themselves when litigation is not
pending, when the possibility of litigation first blossoms in the plaintiffbuyer’s mind. Thus, when parties are attempting to resolve the Dilemma
outside of litigation, Mariposa’s refusal to consider whether plaintiffbuyers may protect defendant-sellers themselves should not be controlling.
Mariposa relied on limited facts. When parties find themselves outside of
litigation, and only the plaintiff-buyer knows that a future action is
imminent, the law should encourage the plaintiff-buyer to preserve
components, perform tests, and take photographs. The window to mitigate
damages is small. Plaintiff-buyers often find themselves under economic
duress, juggling the prospect of granting an adequate opportunity to inspect
without failing to mitigate damages. Accordingly, the holding of Mariposa
should be relaxed to allow plaintiffs to protect defendants when the
defendant either cannot or has failed to do so itself.
226. Mariposa Farms, LLC v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., No. CIV 03-0779 JC/LAM, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49951 (D.N.M. Feb. 3, 2005).
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V. Conclusion
The duty to preserve evidence and the duty to mitigate damages are not
mutually exclusive. Mariposa Farms held as much. But the reality of the
Duty Dilemma goes much deeper. When a plaintiff-buyer alters material
evidence in mitigation of damages, it must first provide the defendant-seller
an adequate opportunity to inspect it. “Reasonableness” guides the analysis.
A plaintiff-buyer must exert reasonable effort to mitigate its damages after
a breach of contract, but the duty to preserve evidence emerges as soon as
litigation is reasonably foreseeable. Thus, when a plaintiff-buyer invokes
the “duty to mitigate” as a defense to the defendant-seller’s spoliation
claim, the question will be whether the buyer provided the type of
inspection that would make mitigating the damages reasonable in light of
the spoliative conduct.
Not all forms of inspection that a buyer may provide are adequate. In
order to show that an inspection opportunity was legally sufficient, and that
mitigating damages was in fact a reasonable thing to do, the plaintiff-buyer
must afford more than just a routine inspection. It must be the type of
inspection that has its eyes on litigation. Deciding whether an inspection
opportunity was sufficient is not new territory; courts should apply the
same analysis involved in issues of proper notice.
The Duty Dilemma also requires that plaintiff-buyers protect defendantsellers by preserving component parts, taking photographs, and performing
expert testing before making alterations. Time is of the essence. Despite the
complexity of the issues involved, there are some cases where a plaintiffbuyer’s photographs, test results and remaining parts would be enough for a
defendant-seller to build its defense. In those cases, courts should
encourage plaintiffs to take these protective measures and mitigate their
damages as quickly as possible. However, the plaintiff-buyer must absorb
all the risk. If the photographs, tests, and parts are decidedly insufficient for
the defendant-seller to form its defense, and no adequate inspection
opportunity has otherwise been provided, the plaintiff-buyer should be
sanctioned for spoliation. The Duty Dilemma is built on fine, grey lines and
limited time—a deadly concoction. Although the defendant-seller breached
the contract, it will never be the beast of burden—the brunt of the legal risk
rests upon plaintiff-buyers with the last clear chance to avoid the Dilemma
from arising in the first place.
Collen L. Steffen
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